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THE HOPE VI PARADOX: WHY DO HUD’S 
MOST SUCCESSFUL HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENTS FAIL TO BENEFIT THE 
POOREST OF THE POOR? 
Matthew H. Greene* 
INTRODUCTION 
In February of 2008, the United Nations (―UN‖) Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination 
in this context, along with the UN Independent Expert on minority 
issues, issued a press release condemning the redevelopment of 
public housing in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
1
 The 
statement focused on the decision to replace demolished housing, 
despite the fact that ―only a portion of the new housing units will 
be for residents in need of subsidized housing and the remainder 
will be offered at the market rate.‖2 For approximately 5,000 
families who were displaced by the natural disaster, this 
redevelopment plan amounts to a denial of the right to return to 
                                                        
 * Law clerk, The Honorable Janis M. Berry, Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts; B.A., Boston College (2003); J.D., Northeastern University 
School of Law (2008). I would like to thank Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand for 
her insight, guidance and encouragement on this article. 
1 Press Release, Office of the United Nations High Comm‘r for Human 
Rights, UN Experts Call On United States To Protect African-Americans 
Affected by Hurricane Katrina, U.N. Doc. HR08023E (Feb. 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter UN Report], available at http://www.unog.ch (follow ―News and 
Media‖ hyperlink, then ―Press Releases & Meeting Summaries‖ hyperlink, then 
―Human Rights Mechanisms (Special Rapporteurs and Experts)‖ hyperlink, then 
―Activities and Statements‖ hyperlink). 
2 Id. 
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their homes.
3
 
The report stressed the severity of the deprivation to which 
low-income tenants
4
 would be subjected: 
The right to an adequate standard of living enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right 
to adequate housing . . . . The inability of former residents 
of public housing to return to the homes they occupied 
prior to Hurricane Katrina would in practice amount to an 
eviction for those who returned or wish to return. 
International human rights law prohibits evictions from 
taking place without due process, including the right of 
those evicted to be given due notice and opportunity to 
appeal eviction decisions. It also requires the authorities to 
ensure that large-scale evictions do not result in massive 
homelessness and to consult those affected on relocation or 
alternative housing solutions.
5
 
This UN Report draws attention to the serious problems 
associated with replacing New Orleans public housing with mixed-
income developments. Although limited to the post-Katrina 
context, the UN Report identifies flaws that are common to public 
housing redevelopment efforts across the country. Indeed, the 
report inadvertently illustrates problems that are endemic in one of 
the largest housing development projects that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (―HUD‖) currently runs. 
Federally financed housing projects are a major part of HUD‘s 
effort to increase access to affordable housing free from 
                                                        
3 Id. 
4 The term ―low-income‖ is a term of art used by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to determine eligibility for subsidized 
housing. Low-income limits are generally set at 80% of the area median family 
income level, however these are often adjusted to account for other metropolitan 
economic factors. See Fiscal Year 2008 HUD Income Limits Briefing Material, 
available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il08/IncomeLimitsBriefing 
Material.pdf (―The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is 
required by law to set income limits that determine the eligibility of applicants 
for HUD‘s assisted housing programs.‖). For the purposes of this article, the 
term ―poor‖ is interchangeable with the HUD definition of low-income. 
5 UN Report, supra note 1. 
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discrimination,
6
 constituting over 60% of HUD‘s total budget 
request for 2008.
7
 HOPE VI
8
 is one of the programs that HUD 
employs for funding public housing projects and, according to a 
wide variety of commentators, it is one of the most successful.
9
 
The program is designed to replace substandard public housing 
developments, which currently accommodate a uniformly poor 
population, with refurbished units to provide housing to a 
heterogeneous community with varied incomes.
10
 This type of 
housing development is commonly referred to as mixed-income 
housing. 
 
 
                                                        
6 See U.S. DEP‘T  OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 
2006-2011 39 (2006) [hereinafter HUD STRATEGIC PLAN], available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cfo/reports/hud_strat_plan_2006-2011.pdf. 
7 For FY 2008, HUD‘s total budget request was $35.2 billion, $21.3 billion 
of which was earmarked for public and Indian housing. U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR  2008  BUDGET SUMMARY 3, 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy08/fy08budget.pdf. 
8 HOPE VI was created by the Departments of Veterans Affairs and 
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1993) (creating 
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere Grants), approved on 
October 6, 1992 by the 1993 Appropriations Act. See Harry J. Wexler, HOPE 
VI: Market Means/Public Ends: The Goals, Strategies and Midterm Lessons of 
HUD‟s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 195 (2001) for a more detailed legislative 
history. 
9 See generally Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: From Archaic to 
Dynamic to Endangered, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
228 (2005); Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool for 
Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y  
527 (2001); Eugene T. Lowe, Mayors Push for Housing, 13 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 319 (2004); Special Report, The Experience at 
HUD, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 280 (2004); Wexler, 
supra note 8; Sean Zielenbach, Catalyzing Community Development: HOPE VI 
and Neighborhood Revitalization, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY 
DEV. L. 40 (2003). 
10 See U.S. Dep‘t of Housing and Urban Dev., About HOPE VI, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ (last visited Oct. 29, 
2008). 
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Through HOPE VI, HUD disburses federal funding upon 
completion of a specific plan by a local housing authority.
11
 To 
receive a grant, the plan must stress the unique characteristics of a 
particular metropolitan area and demonstrate how the funds will be 
used in a way consistent with that particular housing market.
12
 
While the specific goals of each development vary based on the 
particular characteristics of the area, HOPE VI strives to eliminate 
the concentration of poverty by promoting mixed-income 
communities and creating more habitable and safe living spaces for 
residents.
13
 The hope is that, by meeting these two general goals, 
the development will create an environment that encourages 
behavioral changes in the poor and leads to steady employment 
and upward mobility for low-income tenants.
14
 In reality, however, 
projects funded by HOPE VI only accomplish these goals under 
very specific circumstances that are difficult to replicate. 
Moreover, in the majority of these developments, the burden for 
providing low-income housing options is shifted from HUD to the 
surrounding municipality.
15
 
                                                        
11 See U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI PROGRAM  
AUTHORITY AND FUNDING HISTORY (2007), available at   http://www.hud.gov 
/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf. 
12 Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: 
Lessons Learned From the D.C. Housing Authority‟s HOPE VI Projects, 10 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 353, 357 (2001). 
13 Id. 
14 See HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 15–26. But see Andrea D. 
Haddad, Subsidized Housing and HUD Projects: Economic Confinement on 
Low Income Families, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243 
(2005) (challenging HOPE VI‘s reliance on the causal influence of environment, 
given that when poorer residents are placed in wealthier neighborhoods, they 
still do not have the finances to take advantage of their new surroundings). 
15 See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much 
Struggle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (2006). While recognizing the accuracy of the conclusions 
drawn in Bezdek‘s article, this article focuses more particularly on public 
housing tenants who rely on HUD for subsidized housing. In the case of these 
tenants, the cure of HOPE VI ends up being as bad, or worse, than the disease. 
Id. Furthermore, when HUD is no longer building units for subsidized tenants, 
the displaced then have to rely on the surrounding municipality to provide 
housing in an already stressed affordable housing market. Id. The further HUD 
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Practice has shown that mixed-income housing, as a 
philosophy for providing public housing, does not benefit the 
targeted neighborhood or the municipality as a whole. The benefit 
of HOPE VI funding is reaped, for the most part, by the private 
investors who are recruited to leverage financing as a part of the 
HOPE VI application and by residents in surrounding 
neighborhoods who see their property values raised by a 
systematic dispersal of their low-income neighbors. This 
systematic dispersal leads to a physical revitalization of the public 
housing units and a repopulation of the area by a mixture of 
market-rate renters along with a small percentage of the original 
subsidized tenants. HUD claims to use HOPE VI to ―demolish the 
most severely distressed public housing and . . . replace [it] with 
mixed income neighborhoods and developments.‖16 What is 
omitted from this description is that very few subsidized former 
tenants have to be invited back to qualify as a mixed-income 
development that will still be eligible for federal public housing 
funding. 
By contrast, the negative impact produced by the difference 
between HUD‘s stated goals and actual results is felt by ever larger 
groups of people. Just as mixed-income housing is supposed to 
benefit both public housing tenants and the larger metropolitan 
area, as these goals become corrupted the effects are borne by the 
greater population of the city, not only the displaced residents. 
In Part I of this article, I identify the two prevailing schools of 
thought to which HOPE VI critiques generally adhere. In the first 
school are financial and organizational critiques, which discuss the 
economic feasibility and sustainability of the program from a 
developmental perspective. In the second are cultural and 
individual critiques, which focus on how individual tenants are 
affected. Each of these points of view has generated both positive 
and negative reviews of HOPE VI, but few concentrate on the 
financial benefits that should be reaped by individual tenants under 
HOPE VI or the social impact that ensues with the dispersal of 
                                                        
strays from its responsibility to increase access to affordable housing for those 
most in need, the more stress is placed on the city or the state to pick up the 
slack. Id. 
16 See HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 22. 
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public housing tenants and the correlating obligation on state and 
municipal authorities to build structures for tenants that are not 
included in the new development. 
In Part II, I compare HUD‘s stated goals to the practical effects 
of its programs, specifically in three developments that HUD has 
hailed as great successes for HOPE VI. These examples show that 
HUD‘s conception of post-revitalization success does not match 
the goals upon which HOPE VI funding is premised. This inherent 
incongruity can be traced back to two factors: flaws in the criteria 
that are used to award grants, and the use of inappropriate criteria 
to evaluate the development once it is repopulated. 
In Part III, I analyze one development that has experienced 
some of the successes that HOPE VI ostensibly strives for, and 
identify factors that led to sustainable benefits for tenants as well 
as the development as a whole. The catalyst in that development 
was grassroots organization and support from the city rather than 
HUD funding. Notably, neither of these characteristics factor 
meaningfully into the HOPE VI application or subsequent 
evaluation. 
PART I—HOPE VI THROUGH TWO DIFFERENT LENSES 
The mixed-income model has generated a number of positive 
reviews because, unlike traditional public housing, it theoretically 
decreases the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas. More 
particularly, HOPE VI is well received because, rather than 
creating new housing units along the same substandard models that 
existed before, the funding is used to demolish uninhabitable 
public housing and rebuild structures that provide shelter while 
fitting aesthetically into their respective cities.
17
 These new public 
housing developments are designed along the principles of New 
Urbanist architecture and are meant to avoid isolating populations 
of poor people, often minorities, in bleak projects with substandard 
living conditions.
18
 By using funds to revitalize distressed, high-
                                                        
17 See Cavanaugh, supra note 9, at 232. 
18 Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property 
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 275 (2006) (―New Urbanists, a 
highly influential school of urban planners, feature conventional dwelling units 
GREENE 4/16/2009  4:25 PM 
 THE HOPE VI PARADOX 197 
density public housing stock and create attractive developments 
that blend into existing neighborhoods, HOPE VI appeals to 
advocates for public housing tenants as well as to the residents of 
adjoining neighborhoods.
19
   
However, this picture is neither as accurate nor as promising as 
it may seem. The push to revitalize frequently comes into direct 
conflict with the interests of tenants who inhabit the housing that 
must be demolished.
20
 While HOPE VI is premised on an ability to 
determine how many market-rate units have to be created in order 
to change the culture of the development,
21
 tenant advocates are 
concerned with the number of units that are being reserved for 
subsidized renters.
22
 Oftentimes, a HOPE VI grant is approved 
according to a proposal that attempts to minimize this conflict.
23
 
During the implementation of the plan, however, this conflict 
inevitably resurfaces and the public housing authority must make a  
 
 
                                                        
in their communities, but seek to enhance contact among neighbors by, for 
example, including front porches and placing housing units close together.‖). 
19 Wexler, supra note 8, at 203–08. This article draws from the experiences 
of fellows from the Community Renaissance Fellows Program, a collaboration 
between HUD and Yale University between 1997 and 1999. The fellows were 
mid-career professionals chosen to focus on the transformation of public 
housing through HOPE VI, as well as neighborhood change in general. Id. 
20 Arthur M. Wolfson, Lost in the Rubble: How the Destruction of Public 
Housing Fails to Account for the Loss of Community, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 51 
(2005); see UN Report, supra note 1. 
21 Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in Seas of 
Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUS. POL‘Y 
DEBATE 711, 732 (1999), available at  
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1004_wyly.pdf. 
22 See Wolfson, supra note 20, at 64–65 (―[N]ew developments frequently 
contain significantly fewer public units than old developments.‖). 
23 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 356 (noting that HUD scores grant 
applications according to five factors, one of which requires ―an optimal income 
mix of one-third each for public housing, tax credit or other subsidized housing, 
and market rate rental or home-ownership‖); see, e.g., Ehan Barlieb, HOPE VI 
Revitalization Grants: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, and Considering a 
Solution in the Context of Liberty City, Miami, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 201, 
205–06 (2007) (describing the mix of development in the Scott Homes Project). 
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decision in favor of either the tenants or the residents of the 
surrounding municipality.
24
 
This conflict of interest is at the heart of any examination of 
HOPE VI.
25
 The different analyses are generally based on the 
perspective of the author and can be broken down into two main 
categories: those that judge the merits of the program from a 
financial standpoint, and those that focus on the cultural impact on 
individual tenants, families and communities that rely on public 
housing. Furthermore, the critiques that examine the financial 
viability of HOPE VI projects generally focus on the benefits and 
drawbacks for HUD or private investors who contribute capital. On 
the other hand, the critiques that adopt a cultural perspective focus 
on the individuals and communities who are affected rather than 
the principals who fund the developments. 
A. Financial/Organizational Critiques 
The underlying presumption in most of the financial and 
organizational critiques is that it is impossible to construct an ideal 
program that fulfills every housing need.
26
 Assuming this is true, it 
                                                        
24  See, e.g., Barlieb, supra note 23, at 205–06; see also U.S. DEP‘T OF 
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI DEMOLITION GRANT MANAGEMENT AND 
MONITORING FOR FIELD OFFICES 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/demolition/gmmonito
ring.pdf (noting the contrast between procedures for reducing the amount of 
units to be demolished, which requires a reduction of the HOPE VI grant, and 
for demolishing other units than those that were proposed, which only requires 
that the substitute units to be demolished meet the same requirements as those in 
the proposal). 
25 See Wexler, supra note 8, at 225 (―[O]ne of the central challenges of 
HOPE VI is whether the PHA, subject to HUD guidance and oversight, can 
fashion a local HOPE VI plan that balances the demands of a successful mixed 
income development . . . against the needs of low income households that have 
come to depend on public housing.‖); see also Bezdek, supra note 15, at 61–73 
(discussing the effects of urban redevelopment on resident and discussing how 
the costs of redevelopment are borne by residents while the benefits are reaped 
by a small class of ―propertied citizens‖). 
26 See, e.g., Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public 
Housing: Lessons From Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1073 
(2002); Wexler, supra note 8, at 205 (―An economist of the Chicago school 
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follows that the wisest course of action is to fund programs that 
will provide housing to as many low-income renters as possible 
while simultaneously remaining reasonable in economic terms for 
the organizations and investors who fund the development.
27
 This 
is likely to make the program sustainable over a long term basis, 
which is better than a more idealistic program that is less likely to 
succeed in its goals. 
Many mixed-income advocates praise HOPE VI because it 
offers flexibility in financing options that other social services 
programs do not.
28
 This flexibility enables the infusion of private 
sector resources into distressed neighborhoods on terms that are 
attractive to private investors.
29
 Not only is this seen as beneficial 
for the tenants receiving public housing, but the program is also 
politically attractive because it courts private investment while 
providing a social service.
30
 
 
                                                        
might put it more bluntly: we should tolerate some measure of inequity as a 
matter of public policy in order to produce a greater benefit to the larger 
community.‖); Zielenbach, supra note 9 (describing how HOPE VI is 
unequipped to meet goals that would require an economic development program 
and so should focus on the goals that can be accomplished through physical 
redevelopment of real estate and the provision of educational and social 
services). 
27 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 26, at 1080; Wexler, supra note 8, at 205. 
See generally Wayne Hykan & Eric Zinn, Leases in Affordable Housing 
Transaction, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 185, 189 
(2004) (discussing the occasionally independent interests of the various parties 
to a HOPE VI transaction and, in a wider affordable housing context, the 
necessity for compromise). 
28 See Special Report, supra note 9, at 302–03 (HOPE VI was originally 
implemented as a temporary program, so regulations and restrictions were not 
developed to constrain the funding possibilities); Clancy & Quigley, supra note 
9, at 535–37; Hykan & Zinn, supra note 27, at 195. 
29 Id. 
30 Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 538–39 (―Entrepreneurial mayors 
view HOPE IV as an important tool with which to leverage private investment 
in support of a larger neighborhood development agenda.‖); see also Special 
Report, supra note 9, at 302 (―[Financial] flexibility is certainly a factor in the 
outstanding involvement of the private sector in the HOPE IV mixed-finance 
program.‖). 
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Along with financing flexibility, there are claims that HOPE VI 
is a success because it was developed as an experimental program, 
and therefore rules and regulations were not developed to 
artificially constrain financing arrangements and the method of 
pursuing the goals of the programs.
31
 In theory, this allows 
community leaders and the local Public Housing Authority 
(―PHA‖) to design a financing plan that is uniquely suited for their 
metropolitan area.
32
 Such plans can include federal funds as well 
as private investment, with the hope that private investors will 
continue to remain involved in the project to protect their financial 
interest.
33
 This self-interested oversight is seen as a check against 
bureaucratic incompetence.
34
 
However, there are also a number of negative critiques from 
this organizational perspective. Many claim that the administrative 
problems that often plague HOPE VI developments—from the 
application phase, through the funding and rebuilding process, and 
during the actual administration of the rebuilt development—are 
inevitable products of the manner in which HOPE VI funds are 
distributed.
35
 Specifically, these problems can be linked to 
leadership voids and corruption at the local level.
36
 Since local 
leadership is vital to putting together the individualized financing 
plans that HOPE VI applications seek, weakness in such leadership 
has the potential to undermine the entire program.
37
 A large part of 
the debate over HOPE VI is dedicated to the degree of authority 
which should be vested in local housing authorities and whether or  
 
                                                        
31 Special Report, supra note 9, at 302–03. 
32 See id. 
33 See generally id. at 302 (discussing the involvement of the private sector 
as a reason for the success of HOPE VI). 
34 Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 535–36. 
35 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 12; Michael S. Fitzpatrick, Note, A 
Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD‟s Newest Big 
Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 421 (2000); 
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic 
Issues Requiring Systematic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (2004). 
36 See Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9. 
37 Id. 
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not local groups are best suited for implementing the social service 
programs that HOPE VI often promises to provide.
38
 
The literature that adopts this perspective generally seeks to 
make the administration of public housing funds a more efficient 
process. Presumably, a more financially stable program will have a 
higher chance of succeeding over a longer period of time. 
Unfortunately, these critiques often assume that as long as money 
is moving efficiently from funding to implementation, the best 
interests of the recipients of public housing are being served. These 
articles tend to lack a conception of the individuals who inhabit the 
public housing developments.
39
 Furthermore, each development is 
often evaluated over the life of the housing project.
40
 The fact that 
the residents who inhabit the development are constantly in flux is 
either overlooked or ignored. A separate group of articles focuses 
much more exclusively on the perspective of the individual tenants 
and examines whether or not the funding is creating any 
identifiable benefit in the lives of tenants who rely on federally 
subsidized housing. 
B. Cultural/Individual Critiques 
A common theme in the literature that focuses on the 
perspective of the individual is that federal housing projects value 
financial feasibility to the detriment of individual tenants.
41
 There 
is an even more pervasive argument that public housing in general, 
and HOPE VI in particular, focuses on the politics and economics 
of providing housing for the predominately minority tenants while 
ignoring the organic cultural value of public housing communities 
that have inherent worth.
42
 Some advocates claim that a legitimate 
                                                        
38 See Williams, supra note 35. 
39 See sources cited supra note 26. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 115–28. 
41 See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic 
Development and the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
131 (2004); Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic 
Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385 (2003); Wolfson, supra note 
20. 
42 Pindell, supra note 41. 
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culture of public housing exists that should be valued and 
developed rather than destroyed to start again from scratch.
43
 
However, any organic community that exists in a development that 
is deemed distressed is automatically judged as valueless by HOPE 
VI standards.
44
 From this perspective, HOPE VI is characterized as 
an inherently destructive program which presumes that many 
existing public housing developments are worthless, so funds 
would be better spent destroying, rebuilding, and repopulating the 
development rather than attempting to improve flawed but existing 
communities from the ground up.
45
 
From this foundation springs the criticism that funding is 
allocated and evaluated on a development-wide basis rather than 
looking at what is best for individuals and families who are 
dependent on subsidized housing.
46
 There is an argument that, 
while HOPE VI might create physical structures that remedy the 
problem of poverty concentration and urban blight, the losses that 
public housing tenants are forced to incur are hardly outweighed 
by any benefits they eventually attain. Even HOPE VI advocates 
will concede that some residents will have to be displaced via 
Section 8 vouchers in order to create the desired mixture of 
tenants,
47
 but they rely on the assertion that this program creates 
the highest benefit for the largest group of people possible.
48
 It is 
questionable whether empirical data supports this assertion.
49
 
                                                        
43 See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 20, at 54–62. 
44 See generally Pindell, supra note 41, at 390, 415. 
45 Id. at 437 (concluding that HOPE VI could have been used to overcome 
past failures in public housing efforts, but that the primary motivation continues 
to be ―revitalizing cities instead of the poor people within those cities‖). 
46 See generally Pindell, supra note 41. 
47 Section 8 Vouchers (officially renamed Housing Choice Vouchers in 
1998) come with their own particular set of problems. See generally Cara 
Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public 
Housing, 9 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 35 (2002). 
48 See Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531–32 (noting criticism 
concerning shrinking stock of public housing ignores the fact that existing 
public housing is inadequate). 
49 See Paul C. Brophy & Rhonda N. Smith, Mixed-Income Housing: 
Factors for Success, 3 CITYSCAPE 2, 3 (1997), available at http://www.huduser. 
org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL3NUM2/success.pdf (describing how 
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Although this replacement of public housing with mixed-
income developments results in a decrease in the total amount of 
public housing units, some argue that this is justified because the 
existing units were uninhabitable to begin with.
50
 If developments 
are razed and rebuilt with a percentage of the new units dedicated 
for market-rate rentals, then fewer people are afforded subsidized 
housing. HUD claims that the amount of units available to 
subsidized tenants is not being decreased because any habitable 
units that are demolished are replaced with revitalized structures, 
and any units that are remade as market-rate rentals were 
uninhabitable to begin with.
51
 Again, there is still an active debate 
whether or not the empirical evidence favors this explanation.
52
 
HOPE VI attempts to counter these problems by ostensibly 
requiring tenant input for the new development.
53
 In reality, 
though, this is usually a meaningless gesture meant to minimize 
negative attention on the project.
54
 In some cases, the ―tenant 
input‖ is simply a rubber stamp that is supposed to validate the 
                                                        
anticipated results, even if present, are difficult to quantify). This is particularly 
clear when the authors explain their lessons and hypotheses for further research 
that emphasizes the difficulties in achieving the goals of HOPE VI and the 
particularized circumstances that contribute to success. Id. at 23–28.   
50 Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531; Williams, supra note 35, at 
460–61. 
51 Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531. 
52 See e.g., Cavanaugh, supra note 9, at 236 (―[O]ne-to-one replacement of 
demolished or disposed-of units . . . paved the way to the later rebuilding 
successes of HOPE VI . . . .‖); Wexler, supra note 8, at 205 (refuting the 
argument that public housing resources are being misallocated through mixed 
income housing by advising that we ―tolerate some level of inequity . . . to 
produce a greater benefit to the larger community‖); Williams, supra note 35, at 
439 (noting the controversy surrounding whether HOPE VI replaced 
deteriorated housing with ―a sufficient number of new units to house everyone 
who was displaced). 
53 Susan Bennett, „The Possibility of a Beloved Place‟: Residents and 
Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
259, 304 (2000); Cummings, supra note 41, at 142; Williams, supra note 35. 
54 See sources cited supra note 53; see also Williams, supra note 35, at 463 
(―There is apparently an assumption that the people‘s interests will be voiced 
and protected by the institutional players.‖). 
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project from the perspective of the nominal beneficiaries.
55
 
In fact, when HOPE VI builds a new community, it is usually 
doing so by selectively choosing who will repopulate the units and 
excluding many of the lowest-income tenants.
56
 Many of the 
articles in favor of HOPE VI quote statistics that show higher 
incomes relative to the mean for tenants after redevelopment, as 
well as other group economic indicators.
57
 However, these 
statistics fail to account for the tenant turnover, and often fail to 
isolate the subsidized tenants when examining any increase in 
wealth or decrease in poverty.
58
 There is no doubt that redeveloped 
communities will boast better economic statistics, precisely 
because they have been recreated as mixed-income communities. 
That said, it remains to be seen whether any behavioral 
characteristics are transferred between members of different 
economic classes through proximity. Statistics that are offered for 
such developments fail to address whether any benefit is being 
reaped by low-income tenants. 
Finally, HOPE VI is often accused of mirroring and 
accelerating the process of gentrification because the developments 
that fare the best in the application process also happen to be the 
                                                        
55 Bezdek, supra note 15, at 58; Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion 
Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in 
Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 868 (2001). 
56 Bennett, supra note 53, at 298–301; Florence Wagman Roisman, 
Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in 
Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 918–19 (2005); see Cummings, 
supra note 41, at 143 (noting the importance of gentrification in the approval of 
Hope VI applications). 
57 See, e.g., Zielenbach, supra note 9 (comparing eight HOPE VI 
neighborhoods versus citywide statistics in 1990 along with the same data from 
2000). This data is used to support the conclusion that neighborhood per capita 
income increased over time in the HOPE VI developments relative to the city. 
However, there is no indication that the author factored in the extensive tenant 
turnover that takes place in a HOPE VI mixed income development. The change 
from a predominantly poor development to a mixed-income development would 
account for the higher per capita income without any evidence of low-income 
tenants benefiting from the changed demographics. 
58 Id. 
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ones that are most likely to attract private investment.
59
 Moreover, 
in order to attract this private investment, the development plan 
needs to push out subsidized renters and attract market-rate tenants 
who will infuse cash into the neighborhood‘s local businesses.60 
Thus, HOPE VI‘s focus on attracting private investment renders 
sustainable low-income communities less desirable grant recipients 
than poor developments that are already being encroached upon by 
expanding neighborhoods of wealthier residents. 
The problem with critiques on these bases is that, while they 
recognize the human element to these problems, they generally 
ignore the very legitimate organizational problems that are most 
likely to shape HUD and individual housing authorities‘ policies. 
These articles generally set a baseline for how HUD should value 
individual people‘s housing needs, but they fail to consider the 
impact to the surrounding community or the feasibility of 
implementing changes from the perspective of a federal program. 
For the most part, these cultural and individual critiques find favor 
with like-minded commentators, but fail to persuade the 
government to make any meaningful changes to how public 
housing funds are administered. 
PART II—STATED GOALS VERSUS PRACTICAL EFFECTS 
According to a HUD-published study,
61
 a HOPE VI 
development will ideally meet the following goals: 
   The behavior patterns of some lower income residents 
will be altered by emulating those of their higher 
income neighbors. The quality of the living 
environment, not housing quality alone, leads to 
                                                        
59 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 354–56 (―Because of the severe funding 
limitations for major renovations, HUD developed the public/private partnership 
approach to leverage the scarce public dollars needed to replace the worst 
projects with significant private funding sources.‖); John A. Powell & 
Marguerite L. Spencer, Give Them the Old „One-Two‟: Gentrification and the 
K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 451–53 
(2003). 
60 See sources cited supra note 59. 
61 See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 6. 
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upward mobility. 
   Nonworking low-income tenants will find their way 
into the workplace in greater numbers because of the 
social norms of their new environment (for example, 
going to work/school every day) and the informal 
networking with employed neighbors. 
   The crime rate will fall because the higher income 
households will demand a stricter and better enforced 
set of ground rules for the community. 
   Low-income households will have the benefit of better 
schools, access to jobs, and enhanced safety, enabling 
them to move themselves and their children beyond 
their economic condition.
62
 
I will refer to these four goals as follows: 1) behavioral 
transference in the home; 2) behavioral transference in work 
habits; 3) community enforced rules; and 4) proximity to better 
schools and jobs. Unfortunately, few developments actually 
accomplish these goals, and when they do it is generally because of 
circumstances that arose outside of HUD‘s control.63  
Nevertheless, HUD lavishes praise on HOPE VI developments as a 
successful example of public housing.
64
 In this section I examine 
three HOPE VI developments to identify how HUD defines 
success. I then demonstrate how HUD‘s self-proclaimed success 
stories fail to meet the aforementioned four goals. 
                                                        
62 Id. at 6. 
63 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35 (focusing on the Cuyahoga development 
in Cleveland, Ohio and how it was able to succeed despite HOPE VI funding). 
64 See U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., Hope VI: Community Building 
Makes a Difference, Executive Summary (2000), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pubasst/hope2.html [hereinafter Executive 
Summary]. 
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A. Three Developments: The Disconnect Between HUD‟s 
Conception of Success and the Goals of HOPE VI 
1. Centennial Place – Atlanta 
One development that HUD considers a success is the 
Centennial Place development in Atlanta, Georgia.
65
 This 
development received a Blue Ribbon Best-Practices Award in 
1998.
66
 In particular, HUD publicizes access to better schools, a 
new police substation that has reduced crime in the area, and a new 
YMCA community center as evidence of its success.
67
 According 
to HUD, this development is evidence that ―[p]ublic housing 
communities can be effective training grounds for marginalized 
citizens who want to become self-sufficient—and a catalyst for 
revitalization of the larger neighborhood.‖68 
However, the project has sparked criticism because the 
development was only completed by pushing out the majority of 
low-income tenants that had been living there.
69
 The development 
                                                        
65 The Atlanta Housing Authority received a $42 million award in 1993 to 
rebuild Techwood/Clark Howell into Centennial Place. The development was 
completed just in time for the 1996 Olympics, which were hosted in Atlanta. See 
News Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD 
Awards $35 Million Grant to Atlanta to Transform Public Housing, Help 
Residents (Sept. 28, 2001), available at  
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr01-086.cfm. 
66 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35; see also Henry Cisneros & Bruce Katz, 
Keep Hope (VI) Alive, BROOKINGS (May 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20040517_metroview.htm; Julia Vitullo-
Martin, Follow Atlanta Housing Model, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 
(Aug. 24, 2006), available at http://atlantahousingauth.org/pressroom/index. 
cfm?Fuseaction=printpubs_full&ID=151; Field Works, Best Practices: Model 
Program and Databases, November/December 1999, http://www.huduser.org/ 
periodicals/fieldworks/1299/fworks3.html (description of John J. Gunther Blue 
Ribbon Best Practices Award). 
67 See Executive Summary, supra note 64 (describing ―[h]ow the 
groundbreaking HOPE VI public housing revitalization program builds human 
and social capital and restores urban neighborhoods‖). 
68 Id. 
69 See SUSAN J. POPKIN, ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH 
FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE BROOKINGS 
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originally contained 1,081 subsidized units. After reconstruction, 
the development was designed to have 900 units: 360 market-rate 
rentals, 180 affordable rent units for moderate income tenants, and 
360 public housing units.
70
 Only 12% of the residents living at the 
site when the grant was awarded returned after reconstruction.
71
 
Five hundred families were given alternative public housing, 
Section 8 vouchers or administrative assistance in finding housing, 
while an additional 500 families were given no assistance.
72
 The 
Atlanta Housing Authority offers no data on their whereabouts.
73
 
Despite the fact that HOPE VI was ostensibly funded in order 
to help low-income residents, only one-third of the Centennial 
Place units were reserved for public housing.
74
 Moreover, those 
reserved units were not required to be granted to the families who 
had tolerated the distressed living conditions that justified HOPE 
VI funding.
75
 Thus, while the new development was praised for its 
ability to attract market-rate renters and leverage private 
investment while providing a more desirable living space for 
public housing recipients,
76
 the goals of HOPE VI are not achieved 
                                                        
INSTITUTION (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411 
002.html. 
70 Jerry Portwood, Techwood Turnaround: Centennial Place Takes the 
Sting Out of the Low-Income Stigma, CREATIVE LOAFING, Feb. 6, 2002,  
 available at  
http://atlantahousingauth.org/pressroom/index.cfm?Fuseaction=printpubs_full&I
D=30 (―Some housing was lost in the process. As Techwood, the community 
had close to 1,100 units, all for public housing tenants. Today, there are 900 
units, with a third set aside for public housing tenants, who devote 30 percent of 
their income to rent. But the ones who do live in Centennial Place seem to have 
no complaints.‖); see also Hon. William Campbell, Urban Holism: The 
Empowerment Zone and Economic Development in Atlanta, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1411 (1999) (essay written by former mayor of Atlanta); Sabrina L. 
Williams, From Hope VI to Hope Sick?, DOLLARS & SENSE, July-Aug. 2003, 
available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2003/0703williams.html. 
71 Pindell, supra note 41, at 437 n.121. 
72 Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, at 443. 
73 Id. at 442. 
74 Portwood, supra note 70. 
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 70, at 1412. 
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when the majority of subsidized tenants are not invited back to the 
development. Behavioral patterns cannot be transferred in the 
home or the work place when most of the subsidized tenants never 
come into contact with the market-rate renters. 
Furthermore, any community-enforced rules are likely to be 
created by the new middle-income renters. The subsidized tenants 
that are invited back become a minority in the new community, 
and it is doubtful that they are given much of a role in creating or 
enforcing any sort of community rules. Finally, while better 
schools, a new police station and community center are signs of 
progress, the low-income residents who were given alternative 
public housing do not reap the benefits of these improvements. The 
needs of most low-income renters were ignored in order to 
maximize private investment and attract market-rate residents. 
2. Townhomes on Capitol Hill – Washington D.C. 
Townhomes on Capitol Hill illustrates yet another example 
where low-income tenants have been disadvantaged by the 
inherent tension between the interests of low-income residents in a 
development and the desire to build a development that also 
benefits the surrounding municipality.
77
 This development is a few 
blocks from the U.S. Capitol, in an area that has undergone 
substantial gentrification over the last twenty years.
78
 Due to the 
area‘s desirable location, housing prices became inflated to the 
point that no low-income renter could hope to buy or rent in the 
area,
79
 heightening the need for an affordable alternative for people 
on housing assistance. 
 
                                                        
77 See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357–58 (discussing three other 
DCHA projects having similar gentrifying effects); see also District of 
Columbia Housing Authority, HOPE VI Newsletter, 
http://www.dchousing.org/hope6/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) 
(offering DCHA‘s explanation for its goals through implementation of HOPE VI 
funds and its self-appointment as a ―leader nationwide in the design and 
execution of innovative and successful HOPE VI projects‖). 
78 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357. 
79 Id. 
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The HOPE VI funding in this project replaced 134 existing 
public housing units with a mix of market-rate and subsidized units 
as well as thirteen fee-simple, market-rate townhomes.
80
 Instead of 
relying on public housing operating subsidies, the units were 
designed to be internally subsidized.
81
 For this purpose, the 134 
public housing units were replaced with 67 units reserved for 
families at 50% to 115% of median income, 34 for families at 25% 
to 50% of median income, and just 33 for families at 0% to 25% of 
median income.
82
 
The District of Columbia Housing Authority (―DCHA‖) 
promotes this development as a remarkable success.
83
 The project 
is praised for successfully integrating the higher income 
community at its northern border with the lower income 
community at its southern border,
84
 ―while receiving no subsidy 
and maintaining a budget surplus.‖85 The success of the mixed-
income structure is further publicized by evidence that the market-
rate units sold very quickly and that the DCHA continues to 
receive calls from interested purchasers.
86
 
Unfortunately, this development served as the last push out for 
the few remaining low-income tenants in the area. The project 
ultimately succeeded in building only a few units for the most 
heavily subsidized renters. Lynn Cunningham, a professor of 
clinical law at George Washington University Law School and one 
of nine commissioners on the governing board of the DCHA, 
summed up the disparate results: 
From the perspective of the few former residents who get 
the opportunity to own a lovely new co-op home, the 
project is a great success. From the perspective of the 
                                                        
80 District of Columbia Housing Authority, Ellen Wilson/Townhomes on 
Capitol Hill, http://www.dchousing.org/hope6/ellen_wilson_hope6.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2008). 
81 See id. (providing a breakdown of the number and type of housing in this 
development‘s cooperative structure). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 District of Columbia Housing Authority, supra note 80. 
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approximately 20,000 low-income households on the 
waiting list for DCHA housing or Section 8 vouchers, it 
looks like another tool in the hands of the area‘s gentrifiers 
to reduce the number of affordable units.
87
 
Much like the Centennial Place development, it is difficult to 
see how subsidized tenants will attain the goals of HOPE VI when 
they are not invited to return to Capitol Hill. Behavioral 
transference, community enforced rules and proximity to better 
resources all require that a tenant actually be invited to reside in 
the new development. What made the Capitol Hill development 
even more deleterious to low-income renters is that it actively 
hastened the gentrification that was reducing their housing options 
initially.
88
 The goals of HOPE VI are, at best, only achieved by the 
small minority of subsidized renters who were allowed to return. 
These goals, though, were nearly impossible to meet given the 
active effort to transform the area so that low-income residents 
were not able to live there at all. 
 
 
                                                        
87 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357. 
88 See Powell and Spencer, supra note 59, at 453 (―[E]ven if it admits the 
negative effects of its strategies, the government believes that higher property 
taxes resulting from gentrification will eventually be redistributed, for a net gain 
for everyone. But with the current budget deficit, drastic cuts in services, and tax 
cuts for corporate capital, this does not seem plausible. In fact, rather than 
describing gentrification as creating ‗islands of renewal in seas of decay,‘ Wyly 
and Hammel believe it is best described as leaving behind ‗islands of decay in 
seas of renewal.‘‖). But see J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 
HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). Byrne claims that gentrification, though it reduces the 
stock of affordable housing options, is actually beneficial for poor and ethnic 
minorities because this reduction in housing is due to the failure of government 
to secure affordable housing more generally rather than the fault of 
gentrification. Moreover, since gentrification attracts more affluent residents, 
there is a greater opportunity to aggressively finance affordable housing. This 
contention is debatable at best because, among other things, the ability to 
finance affordable housing through a greater tax base is rarely met with the 
desire to do so. 
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3. Plan for Transformation – Chicago 
In 1995, due to the Chicago Housing Authority‘s (―CHA‖) 
disastrous record, HUD took over day-to-day control of Chicago‘s 
public housing.
89
 In the ensuing four years, HUD and the city 
collaborated to use HOPE VI grants, along with other funding 
resources, to drastically overhaul public housing in Chicago in 
accordance with a mixed income strategy.
90
 In 1999, after HUD 
withdrew from controlling the CHA, the new administration 
unveiled the Plan for Transformation, a system-wide blueprint that 
continued to depend on HOPE VI grants and proposed massive 
redevelopment along mixed income principles.
91
 The plan, in most 
cases, called for developments to consist of one-third public 
housing, one-third affordable housing and one-third market-rate 
homes.
92
 
As part of the Plan for Transformation, the CHA agreed that all 
displaced residents would have a right to return; however, the plan 
provides no guarantee that all residents would be able to take 
advantage of this right.
93
 Once HUD funding was secured, the 
CHA wrote into the Leaseholder Housing Choice and Relocation 
Rights Contract that reoccupancy rights would only be granted to 
residents who were lease-compliant as of October 1999.
94
 In 
                                                        
89 Larry Bennett, Restructuring the Neighborhood: Public Housing 
Redevelopment and Neighborhood Dynamics in Chicago, 10 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 54, 57 (2000). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 58; Chicago Housing Authority, The CHA‘s Plan for 
Transformation, http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plan_summary.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2008). See generally William P. Wilen, The Horner Model: 
Successfully Redeveloping Public Housing, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‘Y 62 (2006). 
92 The CHA‘s Plan for Transformation, supra note 91. 
93 See Chicago Housing Authority, The Relocation Rights Contract for 
Residents Who Lived in CHA on 10/1/99,  [hereinafter Relocation Rights 
Contract], available at www.thecha.org/relocation/files/rights_for_moving_out_ 
10-1-99.pdf; Sudhir Venkatesh & Isil Celimli, Tearing Down the Community, 
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Nov.-Dec. 2004, Issue 138, available at 
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/138/chicago.html. 
94 See Relocation Rights Contract, supra note 93; Venkatesh & Celimli, 
supra note 93 (―According to contract, in order to be lease-compliant, a public 
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Stateway Gardens, a development on the South Side, 955 
families—58% of the development‘s population—had already 
moved out on their own before that date because of what the CHA 
has acknowledged as ―deplorable conditions.‖95 Rather than 
acknowledging that tenants who left because they could no longer 
bear the miserable conditions were probably most entitled to the 
benefits of the new development, the CHA took their voluntary 
move as an opportunity to guarantee housing to fewer subsidized 
renters. This way, CHA could lower the number of mandated 
public housing units while maximizing market-rate and affordable 
rate units. 
Moreover, after October 1999, the CHA found cause to evict 
906 families citywide who will no longer be eligible for 
replacement public housing.
96
 For example, Gwendolyn Hull, a 
resident of Stateway Gardens for thirteen years, purposely stopped 
paying her rent in February of 2000.
97
 She documented her 
deplorable conditions, including water damage, leaks, rats and no 
hot water, among other problems.
98
 However, the CHA evicted 
Gwendolyn and her three young children despite its obvious failure 
to maintain the apartment complex.
99
 Evicting residents on bases 
such as these further decreased the amount of public housing units 
the CHA had to provide after redevelopment without violating the 
formal terms of its agreement. 
Not only were tenants given the unenviable choice of staying in 
uninhabitable apartments or relinquishing any right to return to 
their community after redevelopment, but many families were 
evicted by the CHA after October 1999, thus forfeiting any right to 
                                                        
housing tenant should: 1) be current with rent or be in a payment agreement, 2) 
have no utility balance with the CHA or be in a payment agreement, 3) be in 
compliance with the CHA lease, and 4) have a good housekeeping record.‖). See 
generally, Chicago Housing Authority, Understanding Relocation, 
http://www.thecha.org/relocation/overview.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). 
95 Alex Kotlowitz, Where is Everyone Going?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2002, 
available at http://www.alexkotlowitz.com/03_03.html. 
96 Id.; see generally Venkatesh and Celimli, supra note 93. 
97 Kotlowitz, supra note 95. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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reoccupy anyway.
100
 While the new CHA developments have been 
commended for their aesthetics, they house an entirely different 
population than the one that endured the conditions that justified 
HUD intervention. Three of HUD‘s four goals, behavioral 
transference at home and at work, and proximity to better schools 
and jobs, cannot possibly be met when the redevelopment efforts 
include minimizing the rights of tenants to return. Furthermore, the 
fourth goal, community enforced ground rules, seemed to be 
entirely overlooked when the CHA unilaterally imposed a contract 
that framed tenants‘ rights in its own favor. 
B. Lessons Learned 
HUD offers these three HOPE VI projects as successful models 
from which to build. In reality, however, low-income tenants have 
no opportunity to attain the stated goals of the program when they 
are not invited back after redevelopment. This discontinuity 
between goals and effects is endemic of a much larger problem in 
the administration of public housing, a problem touched upon by 
the UN Report condemning redevelopment efforts in post-Katrina 
New Orleans.
101
 While HUD is tasked with providing housing 
options for those that cannot afford them, HUD funding does not 
always benefit those most in need. 
HOPE VI is one program in particular where many subsidized 
tenants are worse off after redevelopment, while other groups, such 
as neighboring property owners, reap the benefits. Ultimately, 
                                                        
100 See Wilen, supra note 91 (comparing the redevelopment of the Horner 
public housing development on Chicago‘s Near West Side, planned as a result 
of a class action lawsuit by the tenants, versus the CHA‘s Plan for 
Transformation, which applies to other public housing under the CHA and is 
funded in large part by HOPE VI, which minimizes the protection of residents‘ 
interests). 
101 See UN Report, supra note 1 (suggesting that international human rights 
law prohibits evictions without due process and requires authorities to ensure 
that large-scale homelessness does not result). HUD publicizes the benefits of 
HOPE VI without acknowledging that these benefits are not realized by the 
majority of those displaced. Depending on the fate of those not invited back to 
any particular development, this could match the severity of the human rights 
issues in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
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HOPE VI fails to benefit the people that HUD is supposed to be 
assisting. This failure is inherently tied to biases in the application 
for HOPE VI grants and the mechanisms that HUD uses to 
evaluate performance at individual developments. 
1. Flawed Application Process 
The first inherent flaw in HOPE VI is the process by which the 
grants are awarded. Each application for HOPE VI funding is 
examined on a scale of five weighted factors: 
(a) the ―capacity of the PHA to carry out the project (20 
pts)‖; 
(b) the ―need for revitalization of a property,‖ including 
whether the property is severely distressed (20 pts); 
(c) the ―soundness of approach,‖ in other words, how 
appropriate it is in the context of the local housing market 
(40 pts); 
(d) the amount of private investment that will be leveraged 
into the new project (10 pts); 
(e) the ―quality of coordination and community planning 
for the development,‖ (including cooperation with city 
agencies and supporting community groups) (10 pts).
102
 
The third factor (and, as a correlative, the fourth because the 
amount of private investment is often an indicator of the financial 
soundness of the project) is given the most weight and can 
accordingly make or break a project‘s application. ―Soundness of 
approach,‖ for the purposes of the evaluation, generally refers to 
criteria including the appropriateness of the project in relation to 
other private non-subsidized housing projects that were created in 
the area.
103
 Thus, applications are weighted towards their 
likelihood of success on financial grounds rather than whether they 
are the most appropriate use of resources for those most in need.
104
 
                                                        
102 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 355–56. 
103 Id. 
104 Robert Solomon, Notes From the Inside: Thoughts About the Future of 
Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 34, 38 
(2000) (―Simply stated, I believe that HUD, in seeking to score applications as 
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The de facto result is that areas that are already experiencing 
gentrification are the ones that receive HOPE VI funding because 
those are the areas most likely to attract private investment and 
market-rate residents.
105
   
A study commissioned by the Fannie Mae Foundation used 
field observation, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data and HOPE 
VI plans to analyze gentrification trends in eight cities for the 
fiscal years 1993 through 1998 that had received HOPE VI 
grants.
106
 The authors concluded that success in HOPE VI projects 
hinged on an ability to attract market-rate residents, and that areas 
that have gone through the natural effects of gentrification are most 
likely to attract sufficient numbers of market-rate residents.
107
 
These residents are more likely to be drawn in when they ―do not 
feel threatened by the proximity of poor families‖ in 
neighborhoods that have already gone through an initial class 
transformation.
108
 This trend can be seen particularly clearly in the 
Townhomes development in Washington D.C.
109
 Success in that 
project has been framed as its ability to attract market-rate 
residents who are willing to live alongside public housing 
tenants.
110
 The DCHA has glossed over the fact that fewer public 
housing options are offered to tenants who depend on public 
                                                        
objectively as possible, has created a system that places form over function and 
rewards grantsmanship more than need. As a result, HOPE VI has spawned a 
small industry of consultants to prepare HOPE VI applications, with total fees 
exceeding $100,000, and, I am told, reaching $250,000.‖). Solomon was the 
Interim Executive Director of the New Haven, Connecticut Public Housing 
Authority at the time his article was published. Id. 
105 See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 358–59 (―Based on the scoring 
system for the award of HOPE VI grants, it is apparent that traditional public 
housing properties with a few hundred units that are located in or near a 
gentrified neighborhood are more likely to be targets for near extinction than 
candidates for sustainable low-income communities.‖). See generally Bennett, 
supra note 53; Wexler, supra note 8. 
106 Wyly & Hammel, supra note 21 at 741. 
107 Id. at 741. 
108 Id. 
109 See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357. 
110 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing 
and Neighborhood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 591 (1999). 
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housing, instead highlighting what it views as a successful class 
transformation. 
The federal government, through mixed-income housing, has 
taken the private investors model for dispersing low-income 
renters and put it to use with the backing of federal funds.
111
 With 
this federal backing, a HOPE VI application can override the 
prevention mechanisms that state and local governments have put 
in place to prevent gentrification.
112
 HOPE VI projects make a 
point of leveraging private investment, but in doing so they 
necessarily cater to the goals of private investors.
113
 This shifts the 
focus from providing housing to those in need to creating housing 
developments that are financially sustainable.
114
 In doing so, HUD 
disregards its responsibility to provide for individual renters who 
depend on housing subsidies when those needs come into conflict 
with economic feasibility. 
                                                        
111 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 356; Powell & Spencer, supra note 59, 
at 451 (―The Department of Housing and Urban Development, (―HUD‖), once a 
barrier to gentrification, now emphasizes privatization, integration of assisted 
and market-rate housing, and reliance on the ‗virtues of the market process . . . 
[to further] socially desirable goals.‘‖) (quoting Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. 
Hammel, Housing Policy, and the New Context of Urban Redevelopment, 6 RES. 
IN. URB. SOC. 217, 218 (2001)). 
112 State and local authorities take steps to limit the adverse effects of 
gentrification through zoning regulation, subdivision control, and rent control, to 
name a few. These efforts are designed to stop private investors from taking 
advantage of low-income residents in order to turn the property into more 
profitable market-rate housing. See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 64–65 (arguing 
that local governments often will pursue revitalization strategies that hasten 
gentrification, believing that the increased property values will lead to increased 
property tax revenues). But see Byrne, supra note 88 (arguing that empirical 
evidence that gentrification harms poorer populations is inconclusive, and in 
some circumstances gentrification can bring about positive effects for the poor 
while reinvigorating a municipality). 
113 See Solomon, supra note 104, at 38–39; Salsich, supra note 110, at 588–
94. 
114 See Pindell, supra note 41, at 397–98 (contending that HOPE VI is 
calibrated to operate to the benefit of the ―working poor‖ while largely casting 
out those in most desperate need of subsidized housing). 
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2. Inappropriate Evaluation Criteria 
HUD additionally demonstrates its shifted priorities in the way 
in which it evaluates public housing management. The Public 
Housing Management Assistance Program (―PHMAP‖) grew out 
of the problems that HUD was having in evaluating the individual 
PHAs across the country that are responsible for the day-to-day 
management of public housing developments.
115
 Since 1992, the 
PHMAP is composed of twelve indicators that are used to 
determine how successfully PHAs were managing their 
developments, and by implication, how efficiently HUD funding is 
being used. The twelve factors include: 
1) Maintaining a high occupancy rate 
2) Modernizing the stock 
3) Collecting rents 
4) Using energy efficiently 
5) Preparing and leasing vacant units 
6) Responding to requests for maintenance 
7) Inspecting units and systems annually 
8) Keeping tenant accounts receivable low 
9) Maintaining appropriate levels of operating reserves 
10) Keeping operating expenses within resources 
11) Carrying out a program of Resident Initiatives 
12) Maintaining a capacity to develop additional units
116
 
The problem with these indicators is that they are all unit- or 
development-based, rather than tenant-based.
117
 No attention is 
                                                        
115 U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY: 
PUBLIC HOUSING MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (1996), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/studies/casehuda.pdf. 
116 Id. at 8. 
117 Bennett, supra note 53, at 298 (―The HOPE VI program, and the 
QHWRA that formalized many of its features into law achieve a contradiction: 
the enhancement of resident participation in planning for new communities ‗. . . 
when virtually no residents remain to participate.‘‖) (quoting Jerry J. Salama, 
The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE VI 
Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio, 10 HOUS. POL‘Y DEBATE 95, 
131 (1999)); Lynn E. Cunningham, Managing Assets/Managing Families: 
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paid to who is living in the units or if there is any continuity in 
tenancy.
118
 Tenant-based evaluation would include factors that are 
better aligned with the goals of HOPE VI. For instance, it would be 
useful to know if a greater percentage of tenants have secured 
gainful employment after development, or what percentage of 
tenants are taking advantage of the better schools and community 
services that were a part of the redevelopment, or whether tenant 
governance groups have developed, and if so, whether there is 
equal representation from market-rate renters and subsidized 
tenants.
119
 
The four goals of HOPE VI all involve individual effects that 
should be identifiable in the tenants after redevelopment.
120
 To 
determine the success of a development, HUD should evaluate 
whether behavioral patterns are altered by comparing the same 
low-income tenants before and after redevelopment. To determine 
if community rules are being enforced, HUD should evaluate 
whether low-income tenants are taking part in creating and 
observing community norms. Finally, to determine whether low-
income tenants are taking advantage of better schools and jobs, 
HUD should look at the status of the same tenants before and after 
the redevelopment.
121
 
 
                                                        
Reconceptualizing Affordable Housing Solutions for Extended Families, 11 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 390 (2002). 
118 See Bennett, supra note 53, at 265–75. However, HUD is not alone in 
making this error. See Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 48–56 (using data from eight 
HOPE VI developments to compare and contrast the effects on the 
neighborhoods). However, the author fails to take into consideration the 
different populations that live in each development before and after 
reconstruction. 
119 See Salsich, supra note 110, at 591–93 (arguing that although proof can 
be offered that middle income persons can be attracted to HOPE VI 
developments, this still does not address whether or not resources are being 
misallocated to draw these new people into developments). 
120 See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 6. 
121 See generally Brenda Bratton Blom, Can the Working Poor Afford 
Decent Housing?, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 131 
(citing the connection between housing and employment, which makes these 
problems interdependent at a federal aid level). 
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HOPE VI funding is premised on the existence of transferable 
behavioral characteristics through mixed-income housing, but 
when HUD evaluates how effective the funding has been there is 
no analysis of whether or not tenants from different income groups 
are interacting, or if any behavioral changes are taking place.
122
 In 
fact, the PHA will receive a better evaluation from HUD by 
dispersing low-income tenants, who are less likely to pay their 
rents, and increasing market-rate units, which will keep its 
incoming resources high in relation to its operating expenses.
123
 As 
it happens, that is exactly what occurred in the three examples 
described above.
124
   
This dispersal of lower income tenants shifts the responsibility 
of building public housing structures from the federal government 
to the surrounding municipality.
125
 In doing so, the federal 
government provides physical housing for a small percentage of 
the people that once lived in a given development, while providing 
subsidies to the remainder that qualify for subsidized housing to 
compete in the private housing market. This places a greater 
                                                        
122 See Bennett, supra note 53, at 298 (arguing that HOPE VI achieves the 
contradictory goal of increasing resident participation in planning when virtually 
no residents remain to participate). 
123 See District of Columbia Housing Authority, supra note 80, (―The 
Townhomes on Capitol Hill receives no subsidy and has maintained a budget 
surplus each of the three years of its operation. The units sold very quickly, 
supporting the mixed-income concept shared by all DCHA HOPE VI sites, and 
the co-op continues to receive daily calls from people interested in purchasing a 
unit despite the absence of any advertising campaign.‖). 
124 See id.; Vitullo-Martin, supra note 66 (noting that the Atlantic Housing 
Authority demolished old units, changed mixture of tenants, and now scores a 
perfect 100 on HUD‘s assessment). 
125 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the 
Federal Government Play?, 36 URB. LAW. 475, 513 (2004) (―In many 
metropolitan areas, the supply of housing, both for sale and rental that is 
affordable to moderate and middle income families, as well as low income ones, 
and is located in reasonable proximity to those families‘ jobs has decreased 
substantially. The private sector has not been picking up the slack, in part 
because demand coupled with exclusionary zoning policies is driving the private 
sector to focus more on housing for upper-middle and upper income households. 
A new federal production program is warranted because of this growing gap in 
supply.‖). 
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burden on the surrounding housing market because there are more 
tenants competing for the same amount of affordable housing 
opportunities.
126
 While the federal government pays rent subsidies 
for the displaced tenants through Section 8 vouchers, it is no longer 
responsible for the capital investment required to create the 
physical housing structures.
127
 Thus, in areas where affordable 
housing is already scarce, the federal government uses funds that 
are supposed to provide housing for the neediest people and 
instead relies on the chosen municipalities to have sufficient 
structural resources in place to house the displaced.
128
 The 
underlying problem is that HOPE VI is funded in the belief that 
public housing structures will be created and revitalized, but in 
practice only a small percentage is reserved for public housing 
while the majority is dedicated to market-rate units. 
PART III—FACTORS THAT LEAD TO SUSTAINABLE SUCCESS 
HUD has acknowledged that income-mixing alone will not 
consistently produce increased employment options and 
opportunities toward upward mobility for low-income tenants.
129
 
That being the case, HUD must either be more realistic with its 
goals and expectations when funding public housing 
developments, or it must factor investment in employment training 
and placement into the costs and application process for federal 
housing funding. 
 
 
                                                        
126 See John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 309, 320 (2000) (arguing that HOPE VI has diminished the overall stock of 
public housing while there has been an overall increase in the number of people 
in need of subsidized housing). 
127 See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 67–71. 
128 Id. at 64 (discussing the differences between displacement via public 
and private means, particularly the remedies that are available to government 
when it displaces residents). Bezdek‘s discussion includes various remedies 
including site selection, notice, public participation, and compensation offers. 
However, none of these remedies are utilized nearly enough with public housing 
residents because they do not hold any property rights to their dwellings. 
129 See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 3. 
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Encouraging public housing residents to attain a more stable 
foothold in society remains a worthy goal for HUD.
130
 The 
administration of public housing should be of a forward-looking 
nature, and, where possible, residents should live in an 
environment that is conducive to upward mobility. Placing 
subsidized residents alongside market-rate tenants has not 
consistently borne the results that proponents of mixed-income 
housing have hoped, but there are other examples of public 
housing that have shown more positive results for the individual 
tenants.
131
 HUD should identify and examine these models so it 
can use funding to emulate conditions that have proven to lead to 
tenant empowerment.
132
 It is important to note, however, that these 
developments often grew organically without the benefit of HUD 
oversight, or even in spite of HUD regulations.
133
 To some extent, 
HUD may have to trust the individual developments when 
administering funds and accept the failures that come with less 
oversight in return for greater potential success for the 
developments that flourish. 
A. Orchard Gardens – A Successful Model 
One development that has been regarded as a successful use of 
HUD funds to create benefits for individual tenants while also 
                                                        
130 See generally Salsich, Jr., supra note 125, at 508–10. 
131 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, 439–41 (citing Cleveland‘s 
Cuyahoga development as a rare success for HOPE VI, not because of the 
efficacy of typical HOPE VI goals but because part of the development was 
turned into a frozen food packaging plant to create job opportunities, and a 
social services ―mall‖ was developed to service residents as well as the 
surrounding community); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Equity and Efficacy in 
Washington State‟s GMA Affordable Housing Goal, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 
539 (2000) (St. Louis‘s Murphy Park development is cited as a success with 
high levels of resident involvement, including setting screening criteria for 
residents and working with the local community to help plan a new school and 
community facilities.). 
132 See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 97–113 (providing a detailed description 
of ways to increase tenant participation, empowerment and stakeholding in 
public housing developments). 
133 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, at 439–41. 
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benefiting the surrounding municipality is the Orchard Gardens 
development in Boston.
134
 Orchard Commons and Orchard 
Gardens are located in the Dudley Square area of Roxbury in 
southwest Boston.
135
   
By the Boston Housing Authority‘s (―BHA‖) own account, 
Dudley Square was considered one of the worst areas in Boston 
through the 1980‘s and into the early 1990‘s.136 Crime was 
rampant, businesses had relocated, and there was almost no 
commercial investment in the area.
137
 What remained was a 
completely isolated pocket of property where subsidized tenants 
lived in dilapidated housing units.
138
 Moreover, the disinvestment 
                                                        
134 PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND 
RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (South End Press 1994) (recounting the 
challenges and successes of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative); 
Michelle Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a 
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 790–93 (2005) 
(noted as the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative); Zielenbach, supra note 9, 
at 56–66 (positive review of HOPE VI and, specifically, an analysis of Orchard 
Park and the DSNI); Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, DSNI Historic 
Timeline, http://www.dsni.org/timeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) 
[hereinafter DSNI Timeline]. 
135 See generally Boston Housing Authority, Planning and Real Estate 
Development: Orchard Gardens,  
http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/deptinfo155.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2008); Boston Housing Authority, Development Information: Orchard Gardens, 
http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/devinfo43.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2008). 
136 Boston Housing Authority, Planning and Real Estate Development: 
Orchard Gardens, http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/deptinfo155.html 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (―When the HOPE VI application for Orchard Park 
was submitted to HUD, Orchard Park was considered one of the most severely 
distressed developments in the BHA‘s portfolio. Its buildings were dilapidated, 
its name synonymous with crime, and its residents were isolated from 
everything around them. In fact, the distress at Orchard Park had spread into the 
surrounding neighborhoods and they, too, had fallen into a state of disrepair and 
abandonment.‖). See generally MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 32 
(describing an examination by the Boston Redevelopment Authority which 
reported the ―devastation of housing in the area‖). 
137 MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 23–35. 
138 Id. 
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meant that there were no jobs in the area.
139
 Thus, once tenants 
began living in Orchard Gardens, there were very few 
opportunities to improve their circumstances by obtaining 
employment and self-sufficiency. 
These conditions are typical of developments that have been 
categorized as blighted, the same conditions that HOPE VI was 
created to remedy.
140
 However, what were once abandoned parcels 
are now over 400 new affordable homes, community centers, and a 
new school, among other developments.
141
 In addition, more than 
500 housing units have been rehabilitated.
142
 Most importantly, 
this development has taken place without displacing a majority of 
the tenants.
143
 This success, on terms that are acceptable to 
developers as well as low-income tenants, was the result of using 
HOPE VI funding to supplement the efforts of a well-organized 
tenants association rather than to disperse the residents of a 
development and artificially create a mixed-income neighborhood. 
An important factor in this success is that, despite the long 
period of decline, Dudley Square has had a consistent history of 
grassroots activism. The Orchard Park Tenants Association 
(―OPTA‖) was formed to advocate for additional resources and 
attention from the Boston Housing Authority.
144
 In the mid-1980‘s, 
members of the OPTA combined with other local advocates to 
create the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (―DSNI‖), an 
organization designed to improve living conditions in Dudley 
Square and the greater Roxbury area.
145
   
DSNI‘s first campaign was to mobilize area residents and bring 
attention to illegal trash dumping that was occurring in their 
neighborhood.
146
 This organization was so effective at channeling 
                                                        
139 Id. at 23–24. 
140 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
141 Maureen Mastroieni, Collaborative and Market-driven Approaches to 
Economic Development and Revitalization, 32 REAL ESTATE ISSUES 1, 47 
(2007). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 162. 
145 Id. at 37–65. 
146 Id. at 67–87. 
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resident anger into protests and positive publicity that Boston‘s 
mayor eventually stepped in to meet their demands.
147
 
Significantly, this was an initial step with which DSNI began to 
demonstrate that the neighborhood was willing to take 
responsibility for its own affairs and work with the local 
government to ensure that resources were directed towards the 
community.   
These relatively modest results created a foundation on which 
to rebuild the community. In 1987, DSNI created a revitalization 
plan that focused on redeveloping its community without 
displacing residents.
148
 It worked to form strategic partnerships 
with organizations in both the government and the private sector, 
winning support by showing that its plan could be beneficial for 
the greater municipality as well as the residents of its 
community.
149
 In 1988, it became the only community group in the 
nation to be granted eminent domain power.
150
 Credibility was 
earned through grassroots organization and outreach to political 
and local business leaders, and this led to identifiable tenant 
empowerment.
151
 
The efforts of DSNI did not miraculously turn Dudley Square 
around overnight, but it did attract positive publicity for the 
neighborhood.
152
 Over time, businesses began to reinvest in the 
area.
153
 Once the Boston Housing Authority received HOPE VI 
funding in 1995, DSNI was enough of a presence that one of its 
founding organizations—the Orchard Park Tenants Association—
                                                        
147 Id. at 84–85. 
148 See Mastroieni, supra note 141, at 49. 
149 Id. 
150 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 126–27 (―To acquire this 
power, DSNI reorganized as an urban development corporation to acquire the 
properties and a community land trust to ensure that the properties would be 
held in perpetuity for the benefit of the residents of their community.‖); Gilman, 
supra note 129, at 793; DSNI Timeline, supra note 137; see generally MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 2 (2008). 
151 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 187–89. 
152
 Id. at 86–87; See generally Mastroieni, supra note 135. 
153 Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 57–59, 64, 65. 
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was invited to take an active role in the redevelopment effort.
154
 At 
this point, DSNI efforts had improved the community enough to 
convince private investors that a financing plan, along with a 
HOPE VI grant, could turn the community around as well as 
providing a return for investors.
155
 Crime and drugs were still a 
problem, and the community was still considered blighted. 
However, the activities of the DSNI showed a spark of potential, 
and with HOPE VI funding, the positive local involvement 
encouraged former residents who had been involved in the change 
to stay in the community after the buildings were razed and rebuilt. 
The success of Orchard Gardens is different from other success 
stories that HUD publicizes in that the efforts of the low-income 
residents were encouraging businesses to reinvest in the area 
before any federal funding was granted. This meant that the HOPE 
VI grant could be used to parlay that interest into private financing. 
In the examples that were mentioned earlier, private investors were 
interested because gentrification was in the process of pushing 
low-income tenants out of the area. In those cases, the HOPE VI 
grant hastened the process of gentrification and attracted 
businesses because efforts were being made to change the 
demographics of the neighborhood. On the other hand, in Orchard 
Park, the HOPE VI grant capitalized on a foundation that had 
already been established by a well-organized and active tenants 
organization. Businesses had begun to come back to the area 
because of the current residents, rather than in spite of them. The 
businesses were then willing to continue developing what had been 
started. 
HUD‘s methods for evaluating improvement in developments 
generally do not take into account this type of tenant input,
156
 but it 
is that very factor that makes Orchard Park a sustainable 
development which incorporates the needs of the subsidized 
tenants, as well as addressing the financial health and appearance 
of the development as a whole. Rather than dispersing low-income 
                                                        
154 See Roberta L. Rubin, Take and Give, SHELTERFORCE, Feb. 29, 2008, 
available at http://www.shelterforce.org/article/print/215/; see generally Boston 
Housing Authority, Orchard Gardens, supra note 136.  
155 See Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 62–63. 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 115–28. 
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tenants, effectively making them the problem of surrounding 
neighborhoods to either house or exclude, tenants must be 
incorporated into the process so that private investment is attracted 
by the community, rather than by the promise of gentrification and 
an incoming middle class set of consumers. 
B. Important Ingredients for Success: Organic Foundations 
and Long Term Sustainability 
Orchard Gardens demonstrates that the administration of 
HOPE VI funds can be successfully based on an organic 
foundation that protects the needs of subsidized tenants while the 
development is integrated into the surrounding metropolitan area. 
If HUD were to attempt to use Orchard Gardens as a model for 
public housing, the first step would involve changing the way that 
HUD evaluates developments. It must place a premium on 
effective tenant leadership and the strength of the community in 
any given housing project.
157
 Moreover, once developments are 
recognized for this vital self-determination, HUD would have to be 
willing to administer funds with a loose regulatory framework so 
that the project could become, at least to some degree, tenant 
driven. This is the only proven way that tenant interests will be 
meaningfully factored in along with the local business and 
government interests that currently dominate the HOPE VI funding 
process.
158
 
While HOPE VI claims to include tenant participation, critics 
routinely dismiss these efforts as token gestures with no real 
                                                        
157 See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 86–91 (explaining the importance of 
community); id. at 97–113 (describing how resident inclusion can be practically 
accomplished). 
158 See generally Kristen David Adams, Promise Enforcement in Public 
Housing: Lessons From Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1073 
(2002); Kristen David Adams, Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable 
Housing in the United States?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643 (2004) (setting forth 
the idea of ―promise enforcement,‖ a creation by the author, as an alternative, 
and possibly a development of HOPE VI principles to better serve affordable 
housing tenants). 
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meaning.
159
 On the one hand, tenants are not able to participate 
throughout the redevelopment process when they are relocated and 
never return to the development.
160
 In particular, the uncertainty 
over who will be invited back makes it particularly difficult for 
tenants to meaningfully contribute to the development plan. On the 
other hand, tenants that do retain residency rights are given very 
little authority, so their input in the project does not result in any 
meaningful benefit.
161
 Resident boards are created and make 
recommendations, but it is difficult to find cases where their input 
has significantly shaped the course of a HOPE VI development.
162
 
The important difference in Orchard Gardens was that, through 
grassroots organizations, tenants were a determinative factor in the 
redevelopment. 
CONCLUSION 
HOPE VI was a step in the right direction, to some degree, 
because it recognized and directly addressed the problem that had 
plagued HUD‘s previous attempts to provide subsidized housing—
completely isolated centers of poverty that inevitably fostered 
crime and drove out businesses. Moreover, it recognized that by 
incorporating private financing in public housing and urban 
revitalization efforts—a cornerstone of HOPE VI‘s mission—both 
low-income tenants as well as residents in the surrounding 
municipality stood to benefit. The examples I have discussed show 
that, at best, private financing offers a flexibility in funding that 
can bolster a solid community foundation. At worst, it can cause 
the principals of a redevelopment effort to lose sight of who the 
                                                        
159 See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 57–58; McFarlane, supra note 55, at 868 
(criticizing the disconnect between the principle and practice of community 
participation in economic development). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 115–28. 
161 See Bennett, supra note 53, at 304 (describing the ostensible tenant 
input that is required in HOPE VI developments but arguing that it practically 
amounts to very little). 
162 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No? Tenant 
Participation in Public Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 
656–79 (2000). 
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beneficiaries should be. HUD‘s role should be to utilize these 
creative financing options while protecting the interests of low-
income renters who rely upon federally subsidized housing. HUD 
must recognize that while deconcentrating poverty by dispersing a 
portion of the subsidized population may have short-term indirect 
benefits (reducing urban blight, creating a more favorable 
environment for businesses), this strategy in the long term creates a 
larger burden on the surrounding metropolitan area and offers no 
benefit for the majority of subsidized tenants.
163
 
Though my proposed course of action is difficult and would 
require a shift in thinking for HUD as an agency, a move in this 
direction would address a number of criticisms that HUD has faced 
for decades. In particular, funding developments that are built from 
grassroots movements will create a stronger foundation and self-
interest among tenants in the success of their own development. In 
the long term, this would make the administration of funds more 
efficient, because it is less likely that HUD would have to start 
again from scratch in 15 or 20 years if a development fails. In 
addition, having an established tenant leadership would ideally 
improve the maintenance of units while providing opportunities for 
tenants to collectively negotiate in their best interests on the same 
footing as businesses and the local government. 
Though some failures may be inevitable, if HUD funds 
developments based on the strength of local tenants organizations, 
it will encourage tenants elsewhere to get organized in order to 
receive funding. As more developments are funded and a larger 
sample set is created, individual factors that lead to successful 
tenant leadership can be identified and utilized in training sessions. 
Sharing responsibility for these developments, at least in part, 
between the federal government and the affected tenants appears to 
be the only way that low-income tenants can attain self-
sufficiency. 
 
                                                        
163 See generally Bezdek, supra note 15, at 61–73 (discussing the calculus 
of costs versus benefits during urban renewal, including the benefits expected by 
local governments that may never materialize as well as the costs to displaced 
residents). 
